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Mike Bechthold. Flying to Victory: Raymond Collishaw and the 
Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941. Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2017. Pp. 281.
Historians and senior Royal Air Force (RAF) officers generally agree 
that the leadership provided by Air Marshal Arthur Tedder and Air 
Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham was a key component in the success 
achieved by the RAF in the Western Desert during the Second World 
War.1 In stark contrast, the leadership of Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Arthur Longmore and Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, in the 
period preceding the arrival of Coningham, is viewed less positively. 
The reasons for this include the widespread acceptance of Tedder’s 
narrative of events, the way the RAF became associated with the 
land operation defeats and the belief that the only opposition facing 
the RAF in the Western Desert was the relatively weak Regia 
Aeronautica.2 In Flying to Victory: Raymond Collishaw and the 
Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941, Mike Bechthold, a historian 
of the First and Second World Wars and the author of a series of 
battlefield guides, argues that Collishaw’s leadership in the early air 
campaign in the desert has been significantly misrepresented and 
wholly undervalued. In evaluating this neglected period of the desert 
war, Bechthold challenges the narrative that has portrayed Collishaw 
as a man who lacked the necessary intellectual and administrative 
skills to rise to the challenge of defeating the combined forces of the 
Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica.
To support his case, Bechthold uses a comprehensive array of 
primary and secondary sources. He begins the analysis with an 
examination of the breadth and depth of Collishaw’s operational 
experience in the First World War, the Crimea, Kurdistan, Palestine, 
Egypt, Sudan, and with the Royal Navy. These experiences required 
him to work with army and naval commanders in operations supported 
1  See, for example, “The End of the Beginning: A Symposium on the Land/Air Co-
operation in The Mediterranean War 1940-43,” Bracknell Paper No. 3, 1992; and 
Wing Commander Dave Smathers, “‘We Never Talk About That Now’: Air-Land 
Integration in the Western Desert 1940-42,” Air Power Review 20, no. 3 (2017): 
32-48.
2  I. Gooderson, “Doctrine from the crucible: The British air-land experience in the 
Second World War,” Air Power Review 9, no. 6 (2006): 7-9; and H. Smyth, “From 
Coningham to Project Coningham-Keyes: Did British Forces Relearn Historical 
Air-Land Cooperation Lessons During Operation ‘Telic’?” Defence Studies 7, no. 2 
(2007): 263-264.
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by extraordinarily fragile lines of supply. Bechthold suggests that 
Collishaw’s experience in this environment made him especially 
equipped to deal with the array of challenges facing the RAF in 
North Africa, in terms of personnel, shortage of equipment and the 
omnipresent inter-service dysfunction. Flying to Victory consists of 
ten chapters, comprising 178 pages of text, 24 pages of pictures and 
7 of maps. The book generally follows the chronological progress of 
the RAF’s involvement in the battles of the Western Desert, from 
1939, when the Italians were contemplating whether or not to enter 
the war on the side of the Germans, to July 1941, a month after the 
British failed in their attempt to relieve the fortress of Tobruk—this 
was the period when the RAF was fighting the combined German 
and Italian air forces.
Bechthold explains how Collishaw optimised the relatively few 
aircraft at his disposal in a campaign designed to create the illusion 
of RAF superiority. The campaign began with attacks against the 
Regia Aeronautica on the ground, before the focus of the offensive 
operations changed to deliver small-scale attacks across a broad front 
in order to unbalance the larger Italian air force and blunt its offensive 
activities. The success of this campaign reduced Italian air attacks on 
British soldiers and prevented what had threatened to be a shattering 
reverse. The case is well constructed, well written and easy to follow, 
though, at times, it narrowly avoids being hagiographic. Bechthold 
contends that the paucity of modern aircraft at Collishaw’s disposal 
limited his options to such an extent that the dynamism, enthusiasm 
and leadership he exhibited during the early fighting, particularly 
during Operation Crusader, has never been properly recognised.
The very different views the army and RAF held about the 
way air power should be employed was at the heart of the many 
problems in planning and coordinating joint operations between the 
British Army and RAF. Bechthold shows how, despite the difficult 
inter-service environment, Collishaw developed personal relationships 
with Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor, Major-General Noel 
Beresford-Pierce and Brigadier William Gott in a way that gained 
their trust in his views on how air power should be employed. 
General Archibald Wavell, however, wanted the RAF to provide 
comprehensive direct support to the army and, whenever RAF 
aircraft were employed in other duties, chose to believe there was a 
direct correlation between the air power the army was given and its 
performance on the battlefield. Wavell praised Collishaw when things 
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went well, but during the retreat from the frontier, when the fighting 
on the ground resulted in an ignominious defeat, Wavell concluded 
that the RAF was chiefly responsible for the rout and was unduly 
hasty in reporting this view directly to the War Cabinet in London 
without consulting Longmore.
Tedder believed that Collishaw had exhibited recklessness in 
supporting the army’s ground operations to reach Tripoli because 
he thought Collishaw had unwittingly allowed the logistics train 
to become perilously close to collapse and that only good luck had 
prevented disaster.
Collishaw later contended that he fully understood the risks 
and benefits of maintaining the offensive. Bechthold also shows 
how Tedder’s assessment of Collishaw’s ability was transmitted in 
‘strictly private’ correspondence with the Chief of the Air Staff, Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, and his deputy Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Wilfrid Freeman. The messages were replete with smears about 
Collishaw’s character and ability and indicate that there was a degree 
of personal animosity between the two men. Tedder counselled that 
Collishaw was naïve, brutal and rash. He compared him to a “village 
blacksmith” and “a bull in a china shop,” who had a tendency “to go 
off half-cock.” Collishaw’s lack of university education may also have 
played a part as Tedder thought Collishaw “lacks a sophisticated 
analysis of events” and was, therefore, unfit “to tackle the Hun and 
the Army” (p. 187). In this context, the way Collishaw’s reputation 
was later callously undermined by Tedder becomes easier to 
understand. It is clear that, despite Collishaw’s many operational 
successes in the face of superior enemy forces, he simply did not 
fit in with the type of senior officers reaching North Africa in late 
1941. Tedder clearly preferred the company of Air Vice-Marshal Sir 
Arthur Coningham, the urbane New Zealander, whose administrative 
skills were as haphazard as Collishaw’s. Without the support of Air 
Commodore Thomas Elmhirst, whose talent for administration were 
renown,3 Coningham may have been less favourably compared to 
Collishaw. 
In the atmosphere of recrimination levelled at the RAF in the 
aftermath of the defeats in Greece and Crete, Portal and Tedder 
wanted to avoid the RAF becoming subordinate to the army in 
the desert. Bechtold explains how, with Portal’s approval, Tedder 
3  V. Orange, Coningham (London: Methuen, 1990), 89.
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devised a strategy to gain the army’s confidence before undermining 
its officers’ claims that only full-scale direct support to their units 
was the best way to win the battles in the desert. Consequently, 
Tedder initially overruled Collishaw by supporting the army’s request 
to keep Hurricane fighters within the besieged fortress of Tobruk. 
Then, in contrast to the way Collishaw had vehemently fought for the 
RAF’s independent activities in the desert, Tedder decided to accede 
to Beresford-Pierce’s demands for an ‘air umbrella’ during Operation 
Battleaxe in the belief that the army’s likely failure to relieve Tobruk 
would help garner Churchill’s support for the RAF’s independent 
control of air power. Tedder also agreed to Churchill’s demand to 
‘throw everything in’ to support the beleaguered forces on Crete 
before blaming Collishaw for not reigning in his aircraft when losses 
increased substantially. While Tedder’s plan to undermine the army’s 
arguments was ultimately successful, Collishaw had successfully 
fought the same battle, albeit with Longmore’s support, without being 
party to the flawed operational design or the consequent loss of life. 
Bechthold argues that Tedder’s decision to dismiss Collishaw 
after Operation Battleaxe was based on the subjective perception 
that Collishaw did not have the capacity for higher-level leadership 
and would be unable to cope with the increasing complexities of 
the desert war. The lack of chemistry between the two men is only 
lightly examined, though it appears possible that it had something to 
do with their very different backgrounds, personalities and contacts. 
Longmore trusted Collishaw and the empathy between them might 
have had something to do with their time in the Royal Navy (RN) 
before joining the RAF. It would have been interesting to learn how 
deeply Portal felt threatened by Longmore’s repeated requests for 
more aircraft to be sent to the Middle East, which had been strongly 
echoed by his fellow army and RN commanders and were reinforced 
by the assessment of General Jan Smuts, the South African President, 
who was one of Churchill’s trusted confidants.4 Collishaw’s closeness 
to Longmore may have prompted Portal’s distrust and Tedder’s 
animosity. 
4  J. Terraine, The Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 308; D. Richards, Portal of Hungerford 
(London: Heinemann, 1977), 230-231; and Robin Higham, Diary of a Disaster: 
British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941 (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 
160-164.
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As you would expect from a project that started as a PhD 
dissertation, the book is very well researched. The only minor criticism 
is that Bechthold has been too ready to accept Collishaw’s belief 
that air-to-ground, close air support missions were disproportionately 
expensive in men and aircraft. Recent research has suggested that 
the pilots’ subjective fears were reinforced by the way the topic was 
taught at the RAF Staff College and articulated in doctrine.5 Overall, 
the book provides a significant contribution to the literature of the 
military history of the fighting in the desert during the Second World 
War. It is likely to be of interest to scholars, amateur historians and 
the general audience alike.
david stubbs, independent researcher
5  Alistair McCluskey, “The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British Air-
Land Battle, 1918-1945,” in Changing War: The British Army, The Hundred Days 
Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, 
eds. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 238, 244; Jonathan Boff, “Air/Land 
Integration in the 100 days: The Case of Third Army,” Air Power Review 12, no. 
3 (2009), 80; Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Combat (London: Collins, 1963), 
240; Wing Commander R.A. Mason MA RAF, The Royal Air Force Staff College 
1922-1972 (RAF Staff College Bracknell, 1972), 1; AP 956, B. E. Smythies D.F.C., A 
selection of lectures and essays from the work of officers attending the first course at 
the RAF Staff College 1922-1923, Experiences During the War, 1914-1918 (London: 
Air Ministry, 1923), 80, 86; A.D. Harvey, “The Royal Air Force and Close Support, 
1918-1940,” War in History 15, no. 4 (2008), 466-468; and R.P. Hallion, Strike from 
the Sky: The history of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945 (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1989), 
16-17.
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